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The editors provide solid suggestions to EJ scholars and activists to
collaborate with the goal to improve the EJ movement. They recommend
that scholars not only report on what is happening, but offer solutions,
advocate for positive change, and link EJ to other fields to build theory as
well as practice. Environmental justice activists should strive for a
coordinated national strategy; build and mobilize resources; frame
problems in terms of class, gender, and national inequities as well as racebased problems; and forge stronger links to the mainstream (corporate)
environmental organizations. The editors and authors sought to assess the
EJ movement and initiate a dialogue that will ultimately strengthen the
movement. For students, scholars, activists, and practitioners ready to
engage in the dialogue, this is an excellent place to start.
David M. Ostergren
Associate Professor, School of Forestry
& Center for Environmental Sciences and Education
Northern Arizona University
Director, Colorado Plateau Cooperative Ecosystem Study Unit
Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms:
Perspectivesfrom Law, Economics, and Business. Edited by Bruce L. Hay,
Robert N. Stavins & Richard H.K. Vietor. Washington, D.C.: Resources for
the Future Press, 2005. Pp. 218. $39.95 paperback.
The current paradigm of environmental regulation, now in its
fourth decade, faces increasing challenges under the strain of an expanding
population and burgeoning conflicts over resource quantity and quality.
One alternative for addressing this strain and for correcting un-regulated
environmental harms is an increased role for corporate social responsibility
(CSR). The concept of CSR has regained broad appeal in response to
perceived negative social and environmental effects from market globalization and trade liberalization over the last decade or so. The questions that
confound advocates of CSR, however, is how far it can be legitimately
pushed before the courts reign in the discretion of corporate managers to
protect shareholder interests and whether society is best served by corporations that seek to increase public welfare by means other than
maximizing profits.
In Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms,
authors Einer Elhauge, John Donahue, Mark Roe, Paul Portney, Dennis
Aigner, Daniel Esty, Forest Reinhardt, Eric Orts, and David Vogel offer a
glimpse of a future where corporations, not regulations, can be, but maybe
ought not be, the environment's savior. Editors Bruce L. Hay, Robert N.
Stavins, and Richard H. K. Vietor advance the interdisciplinary discussion
of CSR by drawing from the language and concepts of the disparate fields
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of social science and legal, business, and economic theory and then offering
a standardized lexicon. The text serves as a useful handbook and reference
for policy makers, academics, and practitioners interested in understanding,
if not advancing or implementing, CSR practices. The book is most useful
for its comprehensive review of the legal and economic constraints and
authority for CSR and its analysis of the economic sustainability of profitsacrificing behavior and of CSR's social and democratic consequences. The
authors grapple constructively over the extent corporations can or should
commit shareholder resources to environmental protection, providing
testable hypotheses for future work. This makes the text especially useful
for academics by suggesting a roadmap for research and analysis still
needed for a practical understanding of just how workable and desirable a
paradigm of corporate self-regulation and social engineering through CSR
might be.
Given the broad successes of American environmental regulation,
one might ask what is the perceived need for CSR? America's critical
resources are generally cleaner and safer for human enjoyment and
consumption today, 30 years after enactment of the nation's first significant
national environmental regulations. Yet numerous ecosystems across the
nation and the world remain in steady decline despite what is perceived as
a heavily regulated field. One of the many facets of this disconnect is that
environmental regulations have been designed to target the low-hanging
fruit of resource degradation and pollution, such as open discharges to
waterways, smokestack emissions, and burial of hazardous waste. The laws
that delivered these original environmental successes overlook the more
pervasive and far more subtle environmental problems of today, including
species decline and habitat loss, among others. Therefore, this era's
challenge will be to mitigate pollution sources and ecosystem degradation
not so amenable to regulation, such as global climate change, the mass
exportation of environmental degradation overseas, and non-sustainable
resource consumption, to name a few looming environmental problems.
These problems present policy makers with the critical question of whether
the current paradigm of government regulation is sufficient for environmental protection, or must alternate solutions be pursued? Can or should
corporations -despite often being seen as being representative of, if not
primary contributors to, the world's foremost environmental problems - be
part of the solution?
One problem arises with that proposition: Corporations are
supposed to be soulless. A corporate manager's chief duty should be profit
maximization, achieved within the bounds established by law for the
benefit of the shareholders, according to the dominant view and along the
lines of the Milton Friedman approach to economics and corporate
governance. Society, then, having achieved optimal wealth, derives the
greatest utility through profit maximization and can, through democratic
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processes and individual choice, redistribute the accrued benefits according
to its needs by this approach. Einer R. Elhauge, Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School, posits in his essay that corporations are soulless because
corporate structure insulates shareholders from normative forces -social
and moral sanctions-that might otherwise engender greater profitsacrificing behavior for the benefit of society, known as corporate social
responsibility.
Perhaps surprisingly, the legal, business, and economic communities
have been confused over whether corporations and corporate managers can
voluntarily comnmit shareholder resources to profit-sacrificing environmental protection and, if so, to what extent managers may do so given their
fiduciary duties when no shareholder benefit is apparent, even in the long
term. Elhauge's essay, the book's most significant contribution and perhaps
most thought-provoking essay, should put an end to that confusion. He
answers the question unequivocally in the book's first entry, which
establishes the text's fundamental argument by challenging the canonical
view of law and economics that corporate managers have a legal duty to
maximize profits. Elhauge establishes conclusively that corporate managers
have the legal discretion necessary through the "business judgment rule"
to sacrifice a "reasonable" amount of shareholder profits for public-interest
objectives, drawing for his support from such sources as common law
doctrine, state corporate governance statutes, and American Law Institute
principles.
Elhauge explains why, from a purely economic perspective, such
discretion is imperative and why an enforceable legal duty to maximize
profits, limiting manager discretion, "would take away the human element
that helps justify allowing the use of the corporate form at all." This
discretion is an essential prerequisite to achieving the goal of the corporate
structure, which, according to Elhauge, is not to maximize profits but to
maximize shareholder welfare. Elhauge says the two are not equivalent
because shareholders have numerous, non-financial social and moral
interests at stake as well. "Considering the other factors," Elhauge
concludes, "reveals that managerial discretion to sacrifice corporate profits
in the public interest is not just inevitable, but affirmatively desirable."
Elhauge makes forceful arguments that CSR - and the economic, social, and
moral sanctions that drive it -can and should play a more important role
in achieving public-interest objectives given that "even the most efficient
and socially optimal legal rules will fail to cover much undesirable conduct"
because mere "conformity with the law does not suffice to render corporate
conduct socially desirable."
Daniel C. Esty then asks the ultimate question facing policy makers
that requires a deeper and broader evaluation: "Do we really want
corporations guided by something other than the law?" Putting too much
reliance or discretion on corporate managers to fix our social problems,
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environmental or otherwise, is fundamentally counter-majoritarian, and in
that sense fundamentally at odds with democracy. "What if," Esty worries,
"companies 'get it wrong' and devote their CSR energies and dollars to
issues that are not public priorities?" or worse, are opposed to society's
interests? Fostering CSR might insulate corporate managers further from
market pressures, giving "an already favored and powerful section of
American society yet more power, discretion, and authority not just to
wield their authority inside the firm, but also to make quasi-political
decisions." His personal generosity to worldwide problems notwithstanding, does anyone really want Bill Gates to hold any more political sway than
he already does?
Even more fundamentally, perhaps CSR is not the correct solution
because the problem is being mis-identified. Mark J. Roe suggests that the
"twin pressures" of heightened global market competition and the acceleration of technological change, not instabilities in corporate law and
transactional and financial pressures, are responsible for runaway profit
maximization. If Roe's "product market cum technology explanation" is the
predominant factor in observed profit maximization and its negative consequences, "then reforms to further insulate managers from shareholders even if sound otherwise - would advance their public-regarding goal only
weakly, because strong product and technological pressures would persist."
If this is so, what then might be the solution to correct the dire state
of our natural environment? Maybe the solution is that old paradigm of
environmental regulation that has been so successful over the last 30 years.
As David J. Vogel asserts in the final comment of the book, our critical
environmental challenges "cannot be addressed without more and better
government regulation." Vogel asks, "Can anyone seriously believe that
American greenhouse gas emissions be reduced.. .without federal regulation...?" The answer to this and the broader questions presented by the
editors of Environmental Protectionand the Social Responsibilityof Firms is that
a combination of normative forces, applied to both democratic processes
and corporate managers, will probably be necessary to achieve the right
level of corporate social responsibility and the proper legislative reforms
necessary to meet this era's environmental challenges.
Adam Rankin
J.D. Candidate 2009
School of Law
University of New Mexico

